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ABSTRACT 
This research focused on wide-area surveillance of public environments for 
potential IEDs (improvised explosive devices) using wireless sensor networks. We 
explored magnetic and infrared sensors from Crossbow Technologies to detect simulated 
emplaced IEDs (emplacement is the step most susceptible to detection) in a public mall 
and along a typical street environment. The threat scenario was IED emplacement in a 
trash receptacle. A network of these sensors was built and positioned in these 
environments with human subjects entering (some carrying ferromagnetic materials and 
some not) and proceeding toward a receptacle. Results indicated that magnetic sensors 
could detect suspicious ferromagnetic materials, though not all simulated IEDs contained 
enough to trigger detection. Infrared sensors were not effective for such tasks as there is 
much background infrared radiation. Our network design was such that data could easily 
be aggregated over many sensors in larger networks. This suggests that the technology 
can be effective for protecting communal areas such as airports and urban areas. Other 
supplementary technologies such as imagery could be linked to build a more robust 
detection network. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 A. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (IED) THREATS 
Improvised-explosive devices (IEDs) are “homemade” bombs containing 
conventional military explosives, such as trinitrotoluene (TNT), and/or common 
household substances such as ammonium nitrate (garden fertilizer), attached to a 
detonator and an initiating mechanism. The classification of IEDs is usually by their 
delivery means; typical classifications include vehicle-borne IEDs (VIEDs), packaged 
IEDs (PIEDs) and roadside bombs. IED threats are particularly difficult for militaries to 
assess and resolve in spite of the recent research across the security spectrum. “The IED 
continues to be the single largest threat that coalition forces face in Iraq; there were 
11784 known IED-related incidents in 2004” [12]. Usually considered a form of 
asymmetric offense, IED incidents can result in significant fatalities and collateral 
damage and are becoming the weapons of choice for the terrorist groups and insurgents. 
IEDs can be devastating weapons due to their ease of targeting state assets such as 
soldiers, government officials, transportation infrastructure, and aid vehicles. 
 The effectiveness of IEDs has impaired many coalition operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. To date IEDs in Iraq alone have claimed more than 1500 lives and injured 
many thousands [3]. IEDs have proven to be highly effective unconventional weapons, 
yet inexpensive for the adversary to build and deploy. It is reported that about $6.1 billion 
has been spent on U.S. efforts to defeat IEDs [26]. But current countermeasures have 
only been partially effective despite of these multi-billion expenditures. 
The deployment of IEDs involves several tasks ranging from motivation to 
funding to emplacement and detonation. While legislative controls such as denying 
access to precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosives [17] may potentially 
disrupt the IED life cycle, a popular approach to defeating IEDs lies with emplacement 
detection. However, such detection is a challenging task when they are buried, and is 
difficult even when they are above ground. 
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B. WORK ON IED DETECTION 
There has been extensive research on IED detection using handheld devices, 
unmanned ground vehicles, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Research has employed a 
myriad of signature-based detection schemes, behavioral disparity, and so on; even mine 
dogs (Warfighter IED Conference, 2005) are beginning to gain popularity as potential 
efficient IED detection tools. We can classify these detection techniques or equipment as 
being active or passive. Active detection means stimulating a response from explosives or 
the device using radiation such as x-rays or radio frequencies. Passive detection means 
trace detection such as vapor or microscopic elements emitted from the explosives. The 
following detection schemes are limited to already-emplaced IEDs.   
1. Passive Detection 
Chemiluminescence (emission of light without emission of heat) used for the 
detection of IEDs, exploits “detection of infrared light emitted from electronically-
excited NO2 chemical compositions which most explosives contain” [4]. This technique 
possesses good sensitivity when used in combination with high-speed gas 
chromatography and can detect a wide range of explosives such as DNT (dinitrotoluene), 
RDX (cyclotrimethylene-trinitramine) and PETN (pentaerythritol tetranitrate).  
A chemical signature-based detection technique with a vapor sensor “Fido” [28] 
is used with the “Dragon Runner” robotic platform (see Figure 1). It is reported that this 
system can detect a wide range of IEDs, even those concealed in vehicles. However, 
there still exist employability issues, such as “the need for a sensor algorithm that alerts 
















Figure 1.   Fido XT deployed on the Dragon Runner (from Ref. [28]). 
 
Another approach is a combination of magnetic sensors and a UAV which uses 
the magnetic properties that are contained in most unexploded ordnance and IEDs (most 
of which contain steel). As described in [34], “magnetic sensors are configured as a 
tensor magnetic gradiometer that detect magnetic targets using magnetic moments.” 







Figure 2.   Depiction of magnetic flux through an area element dA (from Ref. [34]). 
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There are several commercial detection systems (comprised of a suite of sensors 
such as magnetic and chemical) but they are limited in utility primarily due to the lack of 
accuracy, sensitivity and false alarm rates. This could be attributed to a high dependency 
of IED signatures on environmental conditions which complicate data collection and 
performance assessment, particularly in a suburban to urban environment.  
2. Active Detection 
MMW radiometers are sensors used for monitoring soil moisture and other 
geophysical data. [38] proposes using MMW radiometers to detect signatures from 
disturbed soil and vegetation stress that are caused by buried IEDs; images of buried 
IEDs can be constructed by using “MMW active illumination” method. 
Another approach is a nuclear detection system where thermal low-energy 
neutrons detect explosive materials. “Neutrons have excellent penetrating power and 
interact with nitrogen-rich materials, such as explosives, in a well-known and predictable 
way” [4]. This detection technique is based on the release of wavelength-specific gamma 
ray photons when a thermal neutron is absorbed by nitrogen compounds present in 
explosives such as TNT and C4.   
There is also ongoing research to develop chemical sensors through a variety of 
techniques. One interesting development is “advanced nanostructured miniature 
explosives sensors with high sensitivity and fast response” [29]. It uses a molecular 
mechanics analysis using Chem3D (a core application of ChemOffice used for modeling 
and visualization) to locate ideal host molecules to bond with IED targets.  
C. MOTIVATION 
Our thesis attempts to address the detection of the action of IED emplacement. 
Detection of emplaced explosive devices is difficult as they can be concealed to remain 
undetectable by many kinds of sensors. This problem is still more difficult when IEDs are 
emplaced in crowded areas where there exist numerous interferences. Our thesis will 
investigate the feasibility of an implementation of a modular wireless sensor network to 
detect emplaced IEDs. The experimentation will use a sensor system from Crossbow 
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Technologies. It is hoped that with a suitable topology and modular configuration of 
these wireless sensors, greater accuracy can be obtained. This may potentially reduce 
public concerns and services disruptions at places like airports and train stations by 
minimizing first-response actions such as area cordoning and crowd dispersal, as well as 
reduce fatalities in conflict-infested areas of operations. 
D. OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of the thesis is to evaluate a sensor network comprising passive 
infrared and magnetic sensors in the detection of emplacement of IEDs in suburban to 
urban environments. Our objectives are: 
1. Characterization of IEDs (constituents, emplacement and triggering 
techniques, and emplacement environments). 
2. Investigation and recommendation of an efficient topology (positioning) 
of sensor nodes for effective IED detection in a controlled test environment. 
3. A proof-of-concept demonstration of the feasibility of adopting a wireless 
sensor network comprising of magnetic and passive infrared sensors to isolate and detect 
emplacement of IEDs in publicly accessible receptacles, i.e. trash bins, postal boxes, etc. 
E. THESIS ORGANISATION 
Chapter II provides background on IEDs, past and current research, and sensors 
used for IED detection and identification. Chapter III presents our experimental 
methodology including the variables to be investigated, test scenarios based on actual 
IED occurrences, and the employment of sensors. Chapter IV presents the experimental 
results. Chapter V presents the findings from the results and provides an analysis 
(identification of limitations or weaknesses which could be reinforced) of these findings. 
Chapter VI presents the conclusion and proposes recommendations for future work. 
 6
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II. IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
A. IED CHARACTERISTICS  
IEDs, commonly known as "homemade bombs,” are used almost exclusively by 
rogue entities with the intent of achieving an asymmetric tactical advantage over the 
adversary. The DOD-NATO definition is “a device placed or fabricated in an improvised 
manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals 
and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract; it may incorporate military 
stores, but is normally devised from nonmilitary components.”  They are bombs much 
like mines and implemented in an improvised manner to destroy or incapacitate personnel 
or vehicles [10]. IEDs are usually command-detonated and are emplaced with specific 
targets and windows of opportunity in mind (as offensive in nature). Mines, on the other 
hand, are often used in defensive postures such as border defense, denial of access to 
main supply routes, etc. and are triggered by pressure or a tripwire (non-command 
detonation). IEDs are typically composed of an explosive charge, a detonator, and an 
initiating system. They are difficult to detect in part due to the myriad of packaging 
techniques afforded to the bombmaker. However some generalizations are possible which 
will aid IED detection.   
1. Common Constituents 
a. Main Charge 
While there are many types and forms of munitions, PE4, TNT, 
ammonium nitrate (common garden fertilizer), and fuel oil (ANFO) are some of the 
common military and commercial explosives used in IEDs. Objects such as nails, ball 
bearings (also known as shipyard confetti after the metal waste found in the shipyards of 
Belfast), bolts, common hardware, and propane and fuel tanks are often used to enhance 
the fragmentation and thermal effects [5, 10]. Most IEDs use conventional high-explosive 
charges as their payload. However, toxic chemical, biological, or radioactive material 
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could be added to the device, creating other life-threatening effects beyond shrapnel, 
concussive blasts and fire usually associated with bombs. 
b. Initiating System 
An initiating system typically consists of a firing device or switch (electric 
or non-electric), an initiator (usually a blasting cap), and a power source (batteries) if an 
electric initiation is used [10, 12]. Initiating systems (triggers) can include cell phones, 
walkie-talkies, or anything that will receive a radio or electronic signal. Non-electric 
systems are usually based on pressure or tripwire actuation.  
c. Casing 
The casing or container which houses the IED can be anything ranging 
from carcasses, cigarette packets, drink cans, or paving materials to a large truck or 
airplane. Its purpose is to conceal the IED and to provide fragmentation if possible.        
 
Figure 3.   Components of an IED (from Ref. [10]). 
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2. Initiation Methods 
There are two primary initiation methods, instantaneous and delayed [10]. 
Triggering for IEDs may include using commercial electronics or may even be as simple 
as running over a rubber hose to produce enough air pressure to activate a switch.  Some 
IEDs have been remotely detonated with radio frequencies using simple readily available 
low-technology devices such as car alarms, key fobs, door bells, cellular telephones and 
pagers. Remote detonation requires observation of the target area and probably line-of-
sight observation points, but with some standoff ability to watch forces from a distance 
and not be compromised. 
The most popular initiation method is the command detonated/initiated method 
[11]. This allows the adversary the choice of the optimum moment of initiation. It is 
normally used against targets that are in transit or where a routine pattern has been 













Figure 4.   Wireless activation system (from Ref. [15]). 
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Time-delayed devices are designed to operate after a preset time. This affords the 
adversary the advantage of being at a far distance at the time of attacks but requires a 










Figure 5.   IED Timer system (from Ref. [15]).  
 
3. Indicators 
The indicators of emplaced IEDs are somewhat similar to those of conventional 
booby traps. (The DOD-NATO definition is “an explosive or nonexplosive device or 
other material deliberately placed to cause casualties when an apparently harmless object 
is disturbed or a normally safe act is performed.”) They are usually visual, such as 
disturbed soil and sand, isolated boxes and containers along common roads, or exposed 
trip wires, strings or cables left behind by the perpetrators intentionally or accidentally. 
These indicators include both physical and behavioral irregularities. While it is easier 
said than done, most military personnel are taught to look for such telltale signs; 
increased vigilance does increase the possibility of IED detection. Examples [10] of 





• Personnel on overpasses 
• Signals from vehicles and/or bystanders 
• Suspicious objects such as unattended containers 
• Markers by the roadside serving as possible aiming references 
• Graffiti or writings on buildings 
• Disturbances of the ground surface or scattered, loose soil 
• Improvised methods of marking such as piles of stones or marks on 
walls or trees 
• Metallic objects such as drink cans and cylinders 
• Videotaping of seemingly ordinary activities or military activities 
• Unusual behavioral patterns such as the absence of women and 
children, or a noticeably reduced number of vehicles or people in a 
normally busy period or area 
 
 




4. Employment Techniques and Targets 
IEDs are often characterized by their employment techniques. A mine or 
explosive is often used, but unexploded ordnance can be easily engineered to replace 
them. 
• Buried mines can be stacked on top of one another to increase the force of a 
blast. Coupling is a method of linking one mine or explosive device to another, to 
expand the area covered by explosions [10, 11]. Anti-personnel mines may be 
used in daisy chains linked with other explosive hazards (Figure 7). Mines may be 
linked together with trip wire or detonating cord. When the initial mine is 
detonated, other mines may detonate either sympathetically or by design. This 
creates large lethal engagement areas.  
• “To foil devices on the fronts of vehicles using rollers and other methods to 
trigger early detonation, the IED can be designed so the roller will pass over the 
initial, unfuzed device and set off the second fuzed device.”[11] This can in turn 
detonate an overpassed device underneath the clearing vehicle. When the linked 
devices are directional fragmentation mines, they can create a large engagement 
area. 
• On some anti-tank mines, the pressure plate can be cracked and the spring is 
removed to reduce the pressure required to initiate the mine [5]. A pressure-fuzed 
antipersonnel mine can be placed on the top of an antitank mine, thus creating a 
very large mine as an alternative method. 
• A patrol can be attacked with IEDs, inflicting casualties. When first responders 
arrive to help, other pre-placed bombs can be triggered to those personnel, or a 















1. Hidden perpetrator with detonator watching the road. 2. Coalition convoy. 
3. IEDs buried in grass verge linked by ‘daisy-chaining’. 4. Anti-tank mines used as IED. 
 
Figure 7.   Depiction of a typical IED daisy-chaining (from Ref. [15]). 
 
• Typical targets of IED are those of high visibility (including those of high 
exposure to media) or high value, as well as military targets. Lines of 
communications are particularly popular targets due to their frequent, sometimes 
inevitable, use by friendly forces due to the mobility requirements for troop 
replenishment and other logistical requirements. Bridges and overpasses present 
excellent vantage points for IEDs nearby. Checkpoints and control points which 
are critical junctions are also viewed as valued targets.  
5. Locations 
IEDs can be emplaced almost anywhere there is sufficient space for concealment 
and there are possible vantage points for the usual line-of-sight activations. However 
IEDs are most likely to be emplaced along main routes such as supply routes that are 
heavily used by friendly forces. In recent years in Iraq and Afghanistan, IEDs are 
commonly emplaced in urban to suburban areas such as shopping malls, religious 
 
 14
infrastructure, roadsides paralleling government agencies [3], etc. as part of asymmetrical 
tactics commonly used in low intensity conflicts. The IEDs are often activated during 
peak hours to inflict the most casualties. Common IED locations are: 
• Past successful emplacements 
• Trees, lampposts, overpasses, and bridge spans 
• Checkpoints or regulatory points 
• Animal carcasses 
• Buildings 
• Roadway shoulders and road craters (in asphalt layers, dirt tracks, etc.) 
• Frequently traveled routes like patrol routes 
B. GENERAL CATEGORIZATION OF IEDS 
IEDs vary based on the type of explosive used, method of assembly, and the 
method of detonation. The following are some of the general categories of IEDs. 
1. Packaged IED (PIED) 
A PIED may be hastily camouflaged with dirt, rocks, trash or items that are 
commonly found on or alongside roads. These devices can either be detonated by wire, a 
remote control device, or a combination of both. The ease of concealing explosives in 
packages or containers of various forms and sizes suggests that there are literally no 
obvious limits on PIEDs’ sizes and thus the extents of damage - depending upon the 
intended targets and damages to be inflicted, PIEDs’ sizes can range from a small 
beverage can to something larger such as an artillery shell (Figure 8). 
PIEDs have been used in both conventional and non-conventional contexts such 
as main supply routes, and shopping malls and other communal environments 
respectively. Increasingly, vehicles are equipped with armor so as to counteract the 
explosive effects of PIEDs emplaced along critical supply route. To that end, explosively 
formed penetrators (EFPs) have been used in PIEDs against these armored cars; an EFP 
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is a special type of shaped charge designed to penetrate armor effectively at stand-off 
distances. The use of EFPs in PIEDs poses an even greater threat due to their penetration 








         Artillery shell-based IED hidden in bags             Drink can        
Figure 8.   Examples of packaged IEDs (from Ref. [18]). 
 
2. Vehicular IED (VIED) 
A VIED is one of the most common forms of suicide bombing where the 
perpetrator conceals an explosive device in a vehicle; a vehicle-assisted attack offers the 
opportunity for mass casualties [13]. An example of VIED attack was the World Trade 
Center attack in New York in 1993, carried out with rented vehicles carrying an 
estimated 1200 pounds of explosives. Some of the common applications of suicide 
VIEDs include: 
• Broken-down car/truck – the VIED is parked along a known route and the 
perpetrator appears to be fixing a tire or repairing an engine problem, and the 
VIED is detonated as the target comes into range. 
• Single suicide VIED – the bomber pulls up alongside of the target, either at a 
stop or speeds up to ensure target is within the blast radius. 
• Multi-suicide VIED – multiple VIEDs execute the same techniques and 
procedures as above. 
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• Suicide VIED detonation against a complex or facility. 
As 9/11 has seen, a VIED is not restricted to wheeled or static platforms; aircraft 
or other mobile platforms are used as well. Table.1 shows the amount of explosives that 
each category of vehicles can carry and their associated minimum evacuation distances. 
These classifications are particularly useful for area cordoning and crowd dispersal when 
there are suspicious vehicles nearby. These distances may also provide government 
















Table 1.   U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) vehicle-bomb explosion 





3. Suicide Bombers 
Common terms for suicide tactics include martyrdom operations, genocide 
bombings, suicide bombings and suicide attacks. So far there is “no official government 
definition of suicide terrorism” [6]. Suicide attacks are generally inexpensive but highly 
effective. It is estimated that it costs as little as $150 to conduct a suicide attack or 
bombing [12], albeit a certain amount of detailed planning has to be conducted. While 
media coverage is common, another key objective of suicide attacks is to garner 
sympathy and allow romanticization of the act which may aid in recruitment [2]. 
Perpetrators of suicide attacks are usually associated with PIEDs and VIEDs. Such acts 
are usually harder to prevent than other IEDs as they are non-static as compared to 
emplaced VIEDs and PIEDs. 
4. IED Operational Structure 
IED organizational structures are small and typically consist of six to eight 
personnel, ranging from “bombmakers,” “emplacers” to “triggermen” [7]. These 
operatives are usually ex-military personnel adept with basic military operations. The 
bombmakers are usually skilled at bomb-making. Even if unskilled, they can easily 
obtain these skills from other IED cells and via the internet. The emplacer is the one who 
undertakes the highest risk of positioning the IEDs at targeted locations at specific times, 
often traveling along high-trafficked roads frequently patrolled by law-enforcement 
agencies. The triggerman is responsible for detonating the IEDs at an opportune time to 
inflict the greatest damage on the targets. Common detonating means include wireless 
and wired activations using accessories such as cell phones and common household wires 
respectively. While it is essential to attack the entire IED delivery structure, it is most 
feasible to disrupt the IED cycle by apprehending the emplacer; hence the significance of 





C. TRENDS IN IED OCCURRENCES 
In the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, IED attacks have had destabilizing 
and destructive effects on coalition operations. From July 2003 to September 2007, there 
have been 1626 IED-related casualties on the coalition forces in Iraq alone. This shows 
why IEDs are likely to be a serious world problem in coming years. In general, an 
increasing trend in IED-caused fatalities is suggested by Figure 9. 
Table 2 shows IED occurrences by the environments that these IED were found in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. There are three primary categories of environments: city squares, 
roadsides or streets, and confined spaces (which include train stations, airports, shopping 
malls, and places of worship). 
 








City Squares Roadsides / Streets Confined Spaces 
44 Government buildings 103 Train stations 22 
 Others 65 Airports 34 
 subtotal 168 Shopping malls 32 
   Places of worship 75 
   subtotal 163 
     
Total: 375  
 
Table 2.   Tabulation of media-reported IED occurrences from Jun 2006-2007. 
 
Typical environments in which IED occurrences have been reported are urban-to-
suburban terrains and these terrains are complex. Urban areas provide advantages to 
insurgents and terrorists [22], in both combat and non-conventional operations, because 
of the asymmetric benefits of the civilian population and infrastructure. Simulating them 
will be important in the test environments where we will be conducting experiments.  The 
three main kinds of urban environments (see Figure 10) we need to address in 
experiments are: 
City Squares 
• High volume of human and vehicular traffic 
• Plentiful avenues of approach 
• Restricted freedom of vehicular movement and maneuver 
• Degraded communications due to limited lines of sight 
• Identifiable traffic patterns (i.e. rush hours, weekends, day/night hours) 
• Identifiable background infrared and magnetic signatures  
• Containers such as trash bins and mail boxes at fixed known locations 
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Roadsides / Streets 
• High volume of human and vehicular traffic 
• Restricted avenues of approach (particularly with blockades) 
• Restricted freedom of vehicular movement and maneuver 
• Degraded communications due to limited lines of sight 
• Identifiable traffic patterns (i.e. rush hours, weekends, day/night hours) 
• Identifiable background infrared and magnetic signatures  
• Containers such as trash bins and mail boxes at fixed known locations 
• Usually lined with parked vehicles 
• Essential buildings such as financial houses, embassies, other 
government agencies, etc. 
Confined spaces 
• Identifiable human traffic patterns (i.e. festivals, holiday or off-peak 
seasons, and rush hours) 
• Restricted avenues of approach (exits and entrances) 
• Identifiable background infrared and magnetic signatures  
• Existence of containers such as trash bins and mail boxes at fixed 
known locations 


































Figure 10.   Sample pictures of typical IED environments (from Ref. [14]). 
 
D. WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
1. Introduction to Wireless Sensor Networks 
 A wireless sensor network (WSN) is a collection of sensor nodes that are 
organized into a cooperative network [19]; they are ad-hoc systems containing sensors 
connected by wireless links. Wireless sensor networks have numerous applications, 
ranging from habitat monitoring to environmental control [27], and in the military realms 
of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) or “surveillance and battle-space 








a. Utility of Sensor Networks in ISR 
Sensor networks (wireless in particular) can alert command-and-control 
units of events of interest such as presence of unusual personnel and/or objects (such as 
vehicles and suspicious packages). ISR missions often entail a high degree of risk to 
personnel. Hence unmanned systems such as sensors are of practical importance to the 
military for handling missions such as nuclear attacks, biological attacks, chemical 
attacks, and reconnaissance. 
This suggests that the detection of IEDs could benefit from wireless 
sensors networks. Increasingly wireless sensors are used to cooperatively detect and 
identify targets of interest, alert more powerful sensors to capture video and audio data, 
and deliver the aggregated data to command-and-control units with long-range 
communication devices. Figure 11 is a conceptual depiction of an interagency 
cooperative structure using wireless sensor networks for command and control. For 
example, sensor nodes picking up suspicious activities will forward the data via repeaters 
to relay stations. These relay stations then notify backend operators / analysts, whom may 

















Figure 11.   Depiction of wireless sensor network applications and the possible 
interoperability between different agencies (from Ref. [14]). 
 
b. Characteristics of WSN 
While there are many characteristics associated with wireless sensor 
networks as outlined by [9, 20], characteristics important to IED detection are:  
• Minimal intrusiveness (especially when sensors are sited in public areas 
such as shopping malls and airports); 





• Energy efficiency (necessary to maintain as long an operational life as 
possible, particularly when regular battery renewal is infeasible); 
• Security (sensor nodes are usually sited in accessible areas, risking of 
physical sabotage); 
• Minimal human interaction (using ideas such as a highly adaptive 
network topology and properties of self-organization and self-maintenance 
to reduce the need for human interaction other than data processing). 
2. Sensors Review 
The following sections focus on the passive infrared and magnetic sensors as they 
are used in the experiments. 
a. Magnetic Sensor (MS) 
Magnetic sensors measure magnetic flux or the strength and direction of a 
magnetic field; a variation in the magnetic field is caused by an input which creates or 
alters the magnetic field such as a ferrous object moving within the earth’s magnetic field 
(see Figure 12).  The technology for sensing magnetic fields has evolved tremendously 
due to stringent demands for improved sensitivity, smaller size, and compatibility with 
electronic networks. Various sensing technologies are used [24] which include 
magnetoresistive devices (measuring electrical resistance as a function of the applied or 
ambient magnetic flux) and coil or flux-gate sensors (measuring differences in the 






Figure 12.   Schematic of magnetic sensing (from Ref. [24]). 
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b. Passive Infrared Sensor (PIRS) 
The term “passive” means there is no emission of energy by the sensor; it 
merely receives incoming infrared radiation (black body radiation). In general, a passive 
infrared sensor is an electronic device that measures total infrared light radiating from 
objects in its field of view.  They detect motion due to a difference in temperatures, as 
when a human enters its field of observation with the background at another temperature. 
Passive infrared sensors are commonly used in burglar alarms and motion-activated light 
systems. 
c. Other Sensors 
Due to the nature of IEDs and their emplacement techniques, a number of 
other sensors such as seismic, acoustic, radiation, and chemical sensors may be suitable 
for an IED detection scheme. 
Common seismic sensors detect and measure the Earth’s ground motion, 
i.e. vibrations. These vibrations are similar to sound waves in air, but span a wider 
frequency range that extends well below the threshold for human hearing – which could 
serve as part of an intrusion detection system to detect potential IED emplacers at 
unfrequented places. It may also potentially be used to detect vehicular IEDs by perhaps 
characterizing anomalous vehicular movements. 
Acoustic sensors are already used extensively in a number of military 
applications, particularly for the benefit of acquiring threat information at stand-off 
distances. Such sensors usually contain a piezoelectric element which can be configured 
to detect various audio signatures. Similar to seismic sensors, acoustic sensors could be 
used to detect anomaly signatures as part of an intrusion detection system. 
Radiation sensors span a wide range of functionality depending on their 
usage, i.e., types of radiation. In the instance of an IED detection system, an 
electromagnetic radiation sensor may be useful to detect foreign electromagnetic 
signatures of wireless devices used in remotely-activated IEDs, i.e. mobile devices, 
remote controllers, etc.      
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Chemical sensors are perhaps one of the most widely researched sensors 
in current IED detection systems. Due to the nature of explosives, chemical sensors are 
particularly useful in detecting the nitrate constituents which are common to most IEDs. 
3. Introduction to Crossbow Technology 
Crossbow Technology Inc. is a solution supplier for wireless sensor networks and 
inertial sensor systems (refer to www.xbow.com for the company profile and its MSP410 
User Manual). The sensor system that is used in this research is the MSP410, which 
comprises of 8 sensor nodes (termed “motes”) along with a “base station” (see Figure 



















The deployment layouts recommended by Crossbow for typical security 


































Each mote contains a set of magnetic and infrared sensors.  The infrared sensor 
can provide coverage of 360 degrees; the magnetic sensor is a two-axis magnetic field 


























III. EXPERIMENTATION METHODOLOGY 
A. TEST ENVIRONMENTS 
Two sets of test environments are distinguished here. The first set of test 
environments was the quadrangle outside a public mall and an actual public street, which 
were used to establish background thresholds (see Test Case A). The other set of test 
environments were simulated in the school compound for the conduct of Test Case B, C 
and D (see Figure 16 and 17) so that they contained as many signatures as possible that 
occur in actual environments, albeit with limitations on the number of human and 
vehicular actors. For instance, a controlled number of human and vehicular actors were 
introduced into the simulated environments to simulate infrared signatures and magnetic 
signatures of large ferrous objects such as post boxes, escalators, trash bins, and lamp 
posts; a circuit board with batteries to simulate IED circuitry, and wireless devices such 
as cell phones and remote-control toys to simulate wireless electromagnetic signals.   












Figure 16.   Layout of a simulated shopping-mall test environment. 
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It is difficult to conduct experiments in a real shopping mall for reasons of 
authorized accessibility. Figure 16 shows our simulated mall design including such 
representative objects as lamp posts, escalators, and trash bins. The idea was to include a 
controlled amount of signatures while experimenting with a suitable placement of sensors 
















Figure 17.   Layout of a simulated roadside/street test environment. 
 
Figure 17 shows our layout for a simulated roadside / street environment. This is 
readily available unlike a shopping mall, albeit with a certain randomness of signatures 
introduced by passing vehicles. 
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3. Establishment of Thresholds 
We used Crossbow sensors to capture background data or clutter (in actual 
environments) to be used in the simulated test environments. These data are processed 
and thresholds established for normal infrared and magnetic signature readings. These 
were used to determine when foreign entities with abnormal signatures entered the test 
environments. It must be emphasized that these threshold values may not necessarily hold 
true for all environments.  
4. Test Cases  
Test cases were limited due to resource constraints. Every effort, however, is 
made to ensure meaningful results are derived from these test cases to support or refute 
our proof-of-concept in the feasibility of using wireless sensor network for IED detection. 
The independent variables in these tests were: 
• N : number of sensors 
• X : number of iron nails 
• H : height of sensor node relative to ground level 
• d : distance from Crossbow sensors 
• t : thickness of trash bins or similar containers / mediums 
a. Test Case A – Determination of background thresholds 
Test Case A was conducted at a quadrangle outside a mall and along a 
one-way street for test environment A and B respectively during both peak (1200-1400) 
and off-peak (1600-1800) periods. The sensor motes were interspersed at appropriate 
distances (not necessarily conforming to the settings as recommended by Crossbow) due 
to physical constraints.    
b. Test Case B – Study of X 
We examined the number of nails (or amount of ferrous content) and 
distance d which were required to trigger the Crossbow magnetic sensors. Nails permitted 
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ease of quantification, i.e., X nails required to trigger a magnetic reading. With the 
relationship between X and d determined, Test Case B experimented with a single actor 
carrying X nails into the simulated test environment. The purpose of this test was to 
examine the robustness of the sensors to detect and report foreign infrared and magnetic 
signatures. It used an alert dialogue box, as well as presenting the general locations of the 
signatures. The experiment also attempted to determine a feasible topology of sensors for 
effective detection.  
c. Test Case C – Study of IED circuitry  
The main ferrous component of IEDs that are commonly emplaced in  
postal or trash receptacles are usually electrical circuit boards, as compared to an IED 
composed of, say, an artillery round whereby the casing is large and usually ferrous and 
hence producing a larger magnetic signature. Test Case C experimented with an electrical 
circuit to simulate an IED circuitry as shown in Figure 18 to determine the threshold of a 








Figure 18.   Depiction of a typical electrical circuit. 
 
d. Test Case D – Study of Trash Receptacles   
Trash receptacles were common to both test environments. Test Case D 
exploited the results obtained from prior tests. Experiments were conducted with a single 
actor carrying the IED circuitry into the simulated test environment and approaching a 
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trash receptacle along a fixed path as depicted in Figure 19. The purpose of this test was 
to examine the robustness of the sensors in detecting and reporting foreign magnetic 
signatures. Further tests investigated the effects of the thickness of the trash receptacle 
and the waste items (comprising primarily of beverage cans) on the sensitivity of the 
Crossbow sensors. It is hoped to isolate this particular source of threat by finding 
magnetic signatures of potential IEDs. Test Case D also examined the efficiency and 




























1 x mote inside bin
1 x mote beside bin
t Emplaced in trash bin 
at varying ‘impacts’  
N 
N: 8 of these motes are interspersed in the two test environments; not always adhering to the 






B. DETECTION IMPLEMENTATION 
This section explains the approach to detecting ferrous metals, IED circuits, and 
unexploded ordnance using the MSP410 Crossbow platform and its software to gather 
data from the sensor network.  The process was (illustrated in Figure 23): 
• Gathering of raw data from Crossbow motes upon detection of foreign infrared and/or 
magnetic signatures; 
• Identifying and extracting the relevant packets from the data to determine their value 
in measurable units; 
• Comparing of captured readings with thresholds through a database server established 
previously; 
• Issuing a signal or alert to the user platform upon positive identification. 
1. Software 
The software for accessing and managing data captured by Crossbow motes 
included MoteView, SerialForwarder, and TinyOS (the operating system). 
a. MoteView   
MoteView is a simple user control of the Crossbow sensor system setup, 
which comes as a software package with a development kit. It works on a three-layer 
architecture using a mote layer, a server layer, and a client layer (see Figure 20); the 
MoteView software exists on client machines in the client layer. Depending on the 
program which is used in the Crossbow motes (usually compiled in TinyOS 
environment), the data is captured in accordance to the programmed tasks and is stored or 
logged in the databases in the server layer. From here, the user can retrieve selected data 
on the MoteView screen. There are options to view the data logged in the server layer as 
raw data, measurement data (raw data converted to appropriate units of measure), charts, 




Figure 20.   Depiction of data flow within MSP410 three-layer architecture. 
 
b. Surge-View and SerialForwarder 
Surge-View is a set of software tools provided by Crossbow which 
contains the Surge Graphical User Interface, the Stats, and the HistoryViewer programs. 
Through the Surge-View, the user can see the sensors’ board data to aid in studying the 
system’s networking issues.  
SerialForwarder is a Java program used to read packet data from a 
computer’s serial port, and forward it over a server port connection, so that other 
programs can communicate with the sensor network via a sensor network gateway. 
SerialForwarder updates the packet counters in the lower-right hand corner of the 
interface window and does not display the packets itself. SerialForwarder listens for 
network client connections on a given TCP port, and forwards TinyOS messages from the 
serial port to the network client connection and vice versa. Many TinyOS applications 
run with the support of the SerialForwarder program upon startup such as Listen.class 





  TinyOS is an open-source operating system that runs embedded in sensor 
nodes and is used in many wireless sensor networks. It contains built-in interfaces, 
software components, and configurations that programmers can use to build their 
applications in a modular structure. Some of these components read data from and send 
data to sensor nodes, organizing broadcasting methods to all sensors, and interpret data.  
One of the components Listen.class is used to read sensor data upon a trigger of events 
from the mote that senses, and this component is vital for first-hand information and 
tracking of objects. As the motes would report on all foreign signatures within its 
sensitivity range, modifications had to be made to the Listen.class whereby only those 
signatures exceeding a particular threshold would be reported. Thereafter the motes 
would resume to ‘idle’ mode. Typically the motes are able to distinguish and report two 
signatures occurring separately in the order of milliseconds as independent events as 
indicated by the timestamps (with an unique sample number attached to each event), i.e. 
12:30:10 for sample #200 and 12:30:10 for sample #201. 
2. Packet Description 
To read packets for magnetic and infrared values, the representation of data must 
be understood. The MSP410 motes uses the Active Message format or AM, which is 
encapsulated data from the sensor network forwarded to the base station. The format is 
presented in Figure 21 [37]. The UART Address, Type, Group ID, Sensorboard_ID and 
Packet_ID form the Headers and Networking Data. In addition, there is a 5 byte TOS 
Header at the start outside the AM structure. Upon executing a Java program called 
Listen.class that outputs raw data onto the screen, the breakdown of the data segment is 








UART Address Type Group Length Sensorboard_ID Packet_ID Data CRC 
Figure 21.   Depiction of Active Message (AM) data format. 
 
 
1B 7B 1B 2B 1B 1B 2B 2B 2B 4B 
Node ID Unidentified Parent ID seq vref quad pir mag audio Unidentified 
Figure 22.   Breakdown of data segment in Active Message format. 
 
Figure 22 above shows the breakdown of the “data” segment of the AM structure 
shown in Figure 21.  The Node ID is represented as 1 byte and the next 7 bytes are 
unspecified.  The audio bytes are always read as 0 in our implementation as the audio 
sensor was disabled in all of the motes used. Segment packets are read from the raw data 
and converted to decimal format for further use. 
3. Flowchart of Listen.class and Modification 
The Listen.class is a Java program that can read the packets from the motes of the 
sensor network via the base station and display the data in hexadecimal. It can open a 
serial port directly, read the raw sensor data, and display it. However, SerialForwarder 
makes it easier to run the Listen.class and display the data on the screen. And at the same 
time, other applications can read the same packets off SerialForwarder server port.  
The flow of the Listen.class is illustrated in Figure 23. It identifies the mote that 
has been triggered by an event and captures its packet readings for analysis, using 
relevant data stored in a database, of whether they suggest particular types of IEDs. In 




























Figure 23.   Modified flow of Listen.class. 
Send out an alert signal 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
A. TEST CASE A – TEST ENVIRONMENT THRESHOLDS 
Test Case A was conducted at a quadrangle near a shopping mall (Figure 24) to 
simulate a confined-space environment consisting primarily human actors and no 
vehicles. We were unable to conduct the experiment in the shopping mall itself due to 
reasons of practicality and lack of authorization. Human actors carried with them random 
amounts of ferrous materials such as laptops, metal accessories, mobile phones, providing 
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Figure 25.   Depiction of experimental setup for test environment B. 
 
Figure 25 above shows the street used in test environment B, which had both 
human actors and vehicles (both parked and moving). A target area was assumed and the 
motes were placed along the outer perimeter of the road.  The test parameters for both 
environments were: 
• Time: Peak period (1200-1400hrs) 
Off-peak period (1600-1800hrs) 
• Duration: 2 x 30min per experimental run for both periods for 2days 
• Weather: nil precipitation, cloudy 
• N: 8 
• H: 0cm relative to ground level  
Mote 
Base station 
Target building like 
government agency or 






A summary of the results is presented in Table 5 (detailed data is not included for 
this test due to the massive number of readings). These values are averages of the 
registered readings. 
 
Test Environment A Test Environment B 
Peak period 
Magnetic Infrared* Magnetic Infrared 
1375 695 (-) 22147 420 (-) 
Off-peak period 
520 987 (-) 21460 413 (-) 
*Original infrared value for Crossbow sensor is at 1023units. The detection of presence of IR is represented by a  
decrease in the original infrared value hence the (-). 
 
Table 5.   Tabulation of thresholds for test environments A and B. 
 
B. TEST CASE B – STUDY OF X 
The experimental set-up is shown (overleaf) in Figure 26. The height of the mote 
was tested at heights of 0 cm, 45 cm, and 80 cm, representing ground-level, knee, and 
chest height respectively. The latter two are the heights at which a person would normally 


















Figure 26.   Experimental setup for test case B. 
 
The test parameters were:   
• Repetitions: 20 runs 
• X: 5, 10, 20 
• H: 0cm, 45cm, 80cm 
• d: 10cm, 50cm 
• traveling speed: walking pace 
A summary of the results (magnetic readings only) is presented in Table 6 (see 







direction of travel 
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Magnetic readings at H / cm 
0 45 80 
Distance from mote, d / cm  
X / nails 
10 50 10 50 10 50 
5 207 144 559 560 488 492 
10 215 150 667 596 654 512 
20 219 184 882 598 886 534 
  
Table 6.   Tabulation of magnetic readings for test case B. 
 
C. TEST CASE C – STUDY OF IED CIRCUITRY 
The experimental setup for Test Case C was similar to B, except that the nails 
were now replaced with an IED circuitry. A summary of the results (magnetic readings 
only) is presented in the following table (see Appendix C for detailed data). These values 
are an average of the readings.  
Magnetic Readings H / cm
d / cm 0 45 80 
10 294 589 680 
50 221 578 619 
 
Table 7.   Tabulation of magnetic readings for test case C. 
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D. TEST CASE D – STUDY OF TRASH RECEPTACLES 
Test Case D is of interest considering the vulnerabilities associated with trash 
receptacles; they are common to all types of environments, are publicly accessible, and so 
provide convenience for emplacement of IEDs. Trash bins not only conceal the explosive 
device, but can maximize the intensity of the explosion by spraying shrapnel at great 
distances. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has published an “Approved 
Product List for Homeland Security” [8, 35] which outlines the use of “blast resistant 
trash receptacles” to contain the explosive effects resulting from an IED detonation. 
Two motes were used in our experiment: one in the trash bin and one beside it. 
The bin was filled with common household trash (such as rubber, textiles, leather, 
plastics, metals, glass, paper and food scraps) with a human actor walking toward it and 
dropping the circuitry depicted in Figure 19. A report in 2005 [36] said that beverage 
cans are the most common metal wastes generated; this prompted experiments with drink 
cans as well. It is reported in [33] that most drink cans in the U.S. are made of aluminum 
(which is a non-ferrous material) which is undetectable by magnetic sensors (this was 
verified using Crossbow sensors). The purpose of our experiment was to isolate and 
attribute magnetic triggers to potential IED circuitry.  
Two other experiments were conducted to investigate the effects of the 
receptacles’ thickness and the effects of the emplacement force at which an IED was 
emplaced had on the sensitivity of the magnetic sensors (with no change to the size of 
circuitry). Results from latter could be useful for further study of anomalous behavior of 
people loitering [30] around trash bins.   
Thicknesses of typical trash receptacles range from 0.2 cm to no more than 1 cm 
for most settings such as in shopping malls, airports, hospitals, and other communal 
areas. Experiments were conducted for t = 0.2 cm, 0.5 cm and 1 cm, and H = 0 cm, 45 cm 
and 90 cm. The height of the trash was assumed to be 1/3 the height of the trash bin. 
Common household plastic cardboards were wrapped around the main housing of the 
trash receptacle to increase t. It was infeasible for these experiments to use identical 
material as that of the plastic trash receptacle. 
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trash at 1/3  



















Figure 27.   Detailed experimental setup for test case D. 
 
 
Mote 1 Mote 2 H / cm 
t / cm 0 45 90 0 45 90 
0.2 0 483 497 509 516 539 
0.5 0 285 455 - - - 
1 0 268 421 - - - 
 
Table 8.   Tabulation of magnetic readings for test case D (variation with t). 
 
The force that one uses to deposit trash may be a useful indicator of IED 
emplacement [21]), detectable by the changes in magnetic readings of Crossbow 
magnetic sensors. Two cases were investigated, gradual versus sudden emplacement for t 
= 0.2cm and H = 90cm. ("Gradual" is defined here as a gradual movement of IED into 
the mouth of the trash receptacle and placing it just above the trash whereas "sudden" is 
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defined as dropping the IED from the mouth of the trash receptacle.) A summary of the 
results (magnetic readings only) is presented in the following table (see Appendix D for 
detailed data). These values are an average of the readings. 
 
Mode
H/cm              
Gradual Sudden 
90 539 819 
 





V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSES 
A. TEST CASE A 
For test environment A, Figure 28 shows that the motes could effectively sense 
the presence of human agents (or other infrared emissions) in the environment with 
frequent triggers throughout the 30-minute period, and an observable difference between 
the peak and off-peak period. Magnetic triggers, on the other hand, were infrequent and 
sporadic as indicated by the spikes (some agents were carrying laptops), which suggests 
that few agents carry ferrous materials. The infrequent magnetic triggers could also be 
attributed to the sensitivity range of the sensor motes, either due to a low ferrous content 
carried by each agent or that the agents were not within the sensitivity range. Some 
inefficient coverage of the test environment resulted from spatial constraints in the 
quadrangle, as well as the limited number of motes (8) that we had for the experiment.  
The low frequency of magnetic readings also suggests establishing a magnetic threshold 











Figure 28.   Graphical plot for passive infrared and magnetic readings registered during 






















































































































































In test environment B, with vehicular movements unlike environment A, there 
were frequent magnetic triggers with corresponding passive infrared detections (i.e. heat 
from engines). However, there were positive magnetic triggers without any change in 
passive infrared (for the base level of 1023 units) as highlighted in Figure 29. This could 
reflect a cold vehicle engine just turned on. Environmental factors such as air 
disturbances or fluctuations in ambient temperatures were possible influences as well 
[34]. (Electromagnetic interference should not be a problem with Crossbow sensors as its 
magnetometers have a bandwidth of 400 Hz or less, so even strong radio-frequency 
sources like cell phones and base stations should not affect magnetic readings.) Another 
possible cause could be the limited field of view of the motes so that a single vehicle 
would be perceived as separate objects, a heated engine and a cold body. The large 
average magnetic reading of 950 units suggests that magnetic sensors alone in such an 













Figure 29.   Graphical plot for passive infrared and magnetic readings registered during 
peak period in test environment B.   






















































































































































B. TEST CASE B 
Infrared values were not used in Test Case B since the aim was to check if the 
magnetic sensors were robust enough to detect foreign magnetic signatures. For gathering 
of data the Mote-View software was used. Looking at the variation in the distance 
parameter d, there is a higher magnetic reading for nails closer to the motes than further 
away. For instance, at H = 0 cm height or ground level, the average reading for 5 nails 
was higher for d = 10 cm than for d = 50 cm. This observation highlighted the need for a 
good topology of the sensor deployment and sufficient quantity of sensors. There were 
fewer false positives for H = 45 cm and 80 cm than for H = 0 cm or ground level. This 
could be attributed to the sensors’ two-axis magnetometer circuit boards (which are 
aligned horizontally when placed flat on a surface) which had a greater sensitivity for 
objects aligned with the motes. The low false negative rate for H = 45 cm and 80 cm is 
encouraging as these are the heights that agents are expected to carry IEDs (either in bags 
slung over their shoulders or in their hands at about waist level). Hence emplacing the 
motes at a sufficient height is important for sensor deployments. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, Crossbow MSP410 system recommended 
deployment configurations were dense grids and perimeter grids. Our experiments were 
conducted using the dense-grid deployment with the motes positioned at an interval of 5 
ft (the recommended spatial interval is 40 ft). Two deployment directions of the motes 
were tried as shown in Figure 30 and 31. The deployment shown in Figure 31 was more 
sensitive (with magnetic readings exceeding 1000 units) than that of Figure 30. This 
could be due to the magnetic sensor axis (located along the sides of each mote) having a 























Figure 31.   Directional placements of motes perpendicular to the passage. 
 
C. TEST CASE C 
Test Case C was conducted in similar fashion as was Test Case B except for the 
replacement of nails with the IED circuitry. Similar findings occurred. In particular, 
similar average magnetic readings were observed for both IED circuitry and nails though 
they were dissimilar in forms and sizes. This suggests that threshold-categorization of 
IED circuitry may not be possible using magnetic sensors alone as many other objects  
 
Passage Used for Walking 
Passage Used for Walking 
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many trigger readings within the threshold range. Other characteristics such as chemical 
vapors would need to be incorporated to the detection scheme, and would require use of 
other sensors.   
D. TEST CASE D 
Some of the sensors could detect the human actor carrying the IED circuitry (with 
the showing of a dialogue box alerting of potential IEDs) as he approached the trash bin, 
but there were occasional false negatives by some motes attributable to the fact that the 
actor was out-of-range. 
The two motes at the bin were largely successful in detecting the IED as it was 
dropped in the bin. The mote inside the bin had a 100% positive detection. The mote 
outside the bin registered lower magnetic readings and displayed similar trends as Test 
Case C, i.e. a number of false negatives for H = 0 cm, and 100% positive detection for H 
= 45 cm and 90 cm. The magnetic readings had several spike outliers possibly 
attributable to the disturbance of the mote as the IED was dropped, as both a movement 
of the mote or the presence of ferrous materials would trigger a change in magnetic flux.     
The results for various bin thicknesses suggested an inverse relationship between 
a bin’s thickness and the strength of magnetic readings. Consequently, the mote outside 
the bin for t = 1 cm had a higher frequency of false negatives. The simulation of 
emplacement force, though crude, produced observable difference in magnetic readings. 
On average, the readings for sudden emplacement were about 30-50% higher than 
























































































































E. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
• Crossbow sensors may not be suitable for characterization of small 
objects. Even for larger objects there must be other forms of sensing that will describe the 
granularity of materials so that there is a distinct contrast among their characteristics. 
This is vital in detecting possible IEDs and identifying them without raising high 
probabilities of false positives.  
• The thresholds established in our experiments were averages of the 
readings; such computation is crude. The magnetic sensors could detect nearby metals, 
but were unable to differentiate an IED-type object. Hence, a more refined and multi-
faceted algorithm needs to be developed to recognize a wider range of characteristics of 
an IED. 
• Infrared sensors are good at detecting human traffic but are not 
particularly helpful for IED detection. Close proximity of ordinary objects was not 
detectable by infrared sensors as the sensing beams were used over a narrow angle. 
Moreover, there is no distinct radiation of IED objects which the sensors could capture. 
These sensors best serve as effective motion detectors when sited in rarely-frequented 
areas of the environment and deployed for perimeter surveillance.  
• The sensors were highly susceptible to external influences such as air 
disturbances. In particular, magnetic readings were triggered even in the absence of 
ferrous materials. Infrared sensors are also unreliable in environments with temperature 
variations as well as wind changes. 
• Magnetic sensors in isolation may not be suitable for IED detection since 
there are numerous ferrous or magnetic sources, especially in a mall environment. 
However when placed in specific receptacles such as postal or trash bins, magnetic 
sensors may help detect dubious trash. 
• A limitation in the experiments was the number of sensor motes and the 
spatial constraints in their positioning, whereby there were a number of false positives. 
This is in part due to a lack of sensitivity of the magnetic sensors which suggests that 
many are needed for effective coverage. 
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• The topology of the sensors shown in Figure 31 could be a useful 
deployment template for threat scenarios where there are limited ingresses and egresses. 
• Available power is a constant limitation in any outdoor deployment of 
wireless sensor networks. Our experiments required high levels of power consumption 
because the motes reported data frequently – each mote uses two 1.5-volt alkaline AA 
batteries and the mote’s lifespan is estimated at 250 hours and 12000 hours for constant 
active mode and sleep mode respectively (based on the estimated power consumption 
rates reported in [31] and [32]). Though there are algorithms to allow sensors to adapt 
when one or more motes are not functioning, the issue of power supply must be carefully 

















A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
The research is focused on wide-area surveillance of communal environments for 
potential IEDs using wireless sensor networks for a proof-of-concept demonstration. We 
explored magnetic and infrared sensors from Crossbow Technologies to detect some 
actions that could be used in IED emplacement – emplacement is the step most 
susceptible to detection – in a public mall and along typical roadside / street environment 
suggesting potential targets such as government buildings. The threat scenario was 
emplacement of IEDs in trash receptacles (which could be extended to other public 
installation such as postal boxes). A network of these sensors was built and positioned in 
these environments with human subjects entering (some carrying ferromagnetic materials 
and some not) and proceeding toward a trash receptacle. The sensitivity of the sensors 
was determined to be less than 50 cm for small objects (electrical circuit board and nails) 
and two orientations of these sensors were investigated (one of which was more effective 
than the other).  
Experimental results indicated that magnetic sensors were useful in reliably 
detecting suspicious ferromagnetic materials near and in the trash receptacle (though not 
all IEDs will contain enough ferrous content to trigger detection). These magnetic 
sensors, however, were unable to reliably detect small objects, and hence would be 
ineffective in characterizing ferrous content in a typical packaged IED. Infrared sensors, 
on the hand, were not as effective in such environments as there is much background 
infrared radiation.  
The objectives set out for the research were satisfactorily achieved. In particular, 
the experiments showed that magnetic sensors could be used to detect and isolate a 
receptacle-type IED threat. This suggests that magnetic sensors in a sensor network could 
be effective for protecting communal areas such as airports and busy urban areas. Other 
independent technologies such as imagery could be incorporated to build a more robust 
detection network. 
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B. FUTURE WORK 
Two primary areas are identified for further research: 
• Further research is needed in the integration of multiple sensors to 
improve the decision-making process. In particular, other standoff technologies such as 
imagery and chemical sensors could be incorporated to improve the selectivity of the 
thresholds for IEDs, as well as to study the scalability issues associated with such a 
sensor network.   
• Further research should investigate the use of localization such as 
triangulation methods to determine the threat source. The capability of the sensor 
network to locate the threat source is just as vital as its detection. A positive localization 
may minimize unnecessary disruptions like cordoning and crowd dispersal, by confining 






















public class Listen { 
 
     private static int moteID; 
     private static int PIR; 
     private static int mag; 
     private static int b1,b2; 
     private static String dataSourceName = "background"; 
     private static String dbURL = "jdbc:odbc:" + dataSourceName; 
  
// To ensure that the right commands are executed 
    public static void main(String args[]) throws IOException { 
 if (args.length > 0) { 
     System.err.println("usage: java net.tinyos.tools.Listen"); 




 PacketSource reader = BuildSource.makePacketSource(); 
// To check whether there are readings from the serial port.  
if (reader == null) { 
System.err.println ("Invalid packet source (check your MOTECOM environment variable)"); 
     System.exit(2); 
 } 
 
/*This section opens up the data stream and stores the data packets onto the byte array called 
“packet.” The modification here is to check whether the reading is a triggered event, which if it is, it will 
have a reading of 32 packets. Upon receiving the packets, the mote ID, the magnetic and PIR readings are 
calculated to decimal units of measure. */ 
try { 
   reader.open(PrintStreamMessenger.err); 
   for (;;) { 
     byte[] packet = reader.readPacket(); 
  if(Array.getLength(packet) == 32)   
      { 
       moteID = Array.getInt(packet,7); 
       b1 = (int)(packet[20]&0xFF); 
       b2 = (int)(packet[21]&0xFF); 
       PIR = b1 + 256*b2; 
       b1 = (int)(packet[22]&0xFF); 
       b2 = (int)(packet[23]&0xFF); 
       mag = b1 + 256*b2; 
   System.out.println("Current packet is tracked by Mote : " + moteID); 
    System.out.println("with a PIR of : " + PIR); 
    System.out.println("with a mag of : " + mag); 
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    Calendar rightnow = Calendar.getInstance(); 
    int hour = rightnow.get(Calendar.HOUR); 
    int min = rightnow.get(Calendar.MINUTE); 
     int sec = rightnow.get(Calendar.SECOND); 
    int date = rightnow.get(Calendar.DAY_OF_MONTH); 
     int month = rightnow.get(Calendar.MONTH); 
      int year = rightnow.get(Calendar.YEAR); 
        
     System.out.println("Detected at " + hour + ":" + min + ":" + sec); 
     System.out.println("Date: " + month + "/" + date + "/" + year);        
      Dump.printPacket(System.out, packet); 
      System.out.println(); 
             } 
 
/* This section deals with the comparison of the readings with the database IED characteristics, by 
getting a JDBC-ODBC connectivity first followed by using SQL to compare the values. If the readings 
match the values of database, then an alert will be sent out. In this case, the alert is used as a display 
statement onto the screen.*/   
try { 
            Class.forName("sun.jdbc.odbc.JdbcOdbcDriver"); 
            // set this to a MS Access DB you have on your machine 
             
            Connection con = DriverManager.getConnection(dbURL, "","");  
            Statement s = con.createStatement(); 
            s.execute("select type from mall_environ where mag1 <=" + mag + "and mag2    
           >=" + mag); 
            ResultSet rs = s.getResultSet(); 
            if(rs!=null){ 
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             while(rs.next()) 
             { 
              System.out.println("Possible Type: " + rs.getString(1)); 
              } 
              s.close(); 
              con.close(); 
             System.out.println(""); 
             } 
         
 } 
            catch (Exception e) { 
            System.out.println("Error: " + e); 
        }    
   } 
 } 
 catch (IOException e) { 
     System.err.println("Error on " + reader.getName() + ": " + e); 
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APPENDIX B – TEST CASE B DATA 
for d = 10cm
Nails
Height 45cm
5 nails 10 nails 20 nails
Number of Passes Reading Reading Reading
1 534 793 663
2 622 664 745
3 682 657 660
4 644 707 1002
5 508 562 1005
6 510 596 583
7 512 553 1131
8 524 639 1146
9 602 780 993
10 611 783 898
11 509 787 594
12 546 526 626
13 544 654 801
14 531 719 1094
15 509 685 872
16 508 663 1134
17 567 587 762
18 689 685 773
19 522 648 978
20 514 642 1182
559 667 882
Height 80cm 5 nails 10 nails 20 Nails
Number of Passes Reading Reading Reading
1 0 588 853
2 626 787 824
3 597 524 888
4 502 731 952
5 611 649 510
6 573 584 869
7 657 786 1130
8 523 697 1171
9 540 512 1068
10 625 762 963
11 0 548 670
12 505 631 1009
13 619 750 944
14 579 544 854
15 584 777 503
16 608 725 930
17 0 501 1036
18 521 742 659
19 532 652 1021
20 556 582 863




Ground Level 5 nails 10 nails 20 nails
Number of Passes Readings Readings Reading
1 0 0 0
2 500 0 511
3 510 522 0
4 0 0 523
5 590 512 580
6 0 0 0
7 0 0 0
8 503 523 566
9 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
11 511 562 0
12 0 0 522
13 0 512 0
14 522 0 0
15 510 531 512
16 0 0 562
17 502 526 0
18 0 0 0
19 0 610 0
20 0 0 604


















for d = 50cm
Nails
Height 45cm
5 nails 10 nails 20 nails
Number of Passes Reading Reading Reading
1 534 519 622
2 622 643 511
3 701 583 633
4 644 669 587
5 508 539 575
6 510 527 586
7 512 537 621
8 524 675 630
9 602 537 603
10 611 555 679
11 509 682 571
12 546 649 558
13 544 554 547
14 531 658 692
15 509 677 545
16 508 561 539
17 567 650 578
18 689 579 610
19 522 587 674
20 514 547 590
560 596 598
Height 80cm 5 nails 10 nails 20 Nails
Number of Passes Reading Reading Reading
1 0 530 580
2 626 657 504
3 597 0 655
4 502 548 676
5 624 550 511
6 573 664 0
7 657 651 649
8 598 544 572
9 540 593 561
10 625 0 694
11 0 698 577
12 505 637 598
13 619 574 572
14 579 697 599
15 584 535 0
16 608 0 582
17 0 620 553
18 521 669 682
19 532 549 593
20 556 512 513






Ground Level 5 nails 10 nails 20 nails
Number of Passes Readings Readings Reading
1 0 0 0
2 500 0 0
3 0 622 0
4 0 0 0
5 690 0 690
6 0 0 0
7 0 0 0
8 501 520 731
9 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
11 0 544 0
12 0 0 504
13 0 0 0
14 680 0 0
15 0 631 690
16 0 0 512
17 503 0 0
18 0 0 0
19 0 690 0
20 0 0 550
144 150 184  
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APPENDIX C – TEST CASE C DATA 
Circuit Board
d = 50cm 80cm 45cm ground 80cm 45cm ground
Number of Passes Reading Reading Reading d = 10cm
1 744 508 0 770 543 0
2 680 568 534 767 522 567
3 666 554 610 763 562 673
4 765 661 0 784 765 558
5 651 585 0 789 732 671
6 670 640 553 831 620 553
7 653 556 0 675 534 0
8 531 606 0 688 539 577
9 583 548 0 697 598 0
10 621 503 610 703 603 0
11 511 638 534 781 702 621
12 706 694 0 693 579 0
13 507 595 0 621 560 0
14 511 512 521 665 574 577
15 527 506 556 553 588 0
16 548 603 0 579 602 0
17 657 557 0 563 533 560
18 501 583 501 559 537 521
19 776 550 0 590 542 0
20 579 596 0 534 549 0
619 578 221 680 589 294
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APPENDIX D – TEST CASE D DATA 
Test D outside mote height=0cm, t=0.2cm Test D outside mote height=90cm, t=0.2cm
Id Sample # pir mag Id Sample # pir mag
6 5 969 0 1 145 1023 515
1 8 701 0 6 227 1023 529
1 9 991 0 1 146 1023 515
6 6 1023 0 6 229 1023 514
6 7 1023 0 6 231 918 502
6 8 1023 0 1 147 665 526
6 9 1023 0 1 148 1023 526
6 10 1023 0 6 232 1023 502
1 10 682 0 6 234 910 0
6 11 741 0 1 149 727 515
6 12 759 0 6 235 910 504
1 11 991 0 1 150 1023 515
6 13 778 0 6 236 1023 504
1 12 693 501 6 239 875 518
6 14 1023 0 1 155 1023 525
6 15 1023 0 6 241 1023 515
6 16 719 0 1 156 1023 525
1 13 1023 0 6 244 973 503
1 14 1023 0 1 158 610 522
6 17 1023 0 6 245 973 503
6 37 951 0 1 159 1023 522
6 38 1023 0 6 246 973 513
1 26 953 0 6 247 1023 513
1 27 1023 529 1 164 662 520
6 39 1023 0 1 165 1023 520
6 40 1023 0 6 253 979 511
6 41 919 511 1 167 682 514
6 42 919 503 6 254 1023 508
6 43 1023 508 6 255 1023 508
1 30 985 0 1 168 1023 514
6 44 830 0 1 169 1023 975
1 31 0 512 6 256 1023 531
6 45 1023 0 6 257 1023 531
6 46 649 0 1 170 821 503
1 36 1017 0 6 258 1023 516
1 37 1017 507 1 171 821 503
6 47 1023 0 6 262 862 505
6 48 905 0 1 175 1023 531
6 49 1023 0 1 176 609 520
1 38 645 503 6 266 860 515
6 50 1023 0 1 177 1023 520
1 39 0 507 6 267 943 515
1 40 1023 507 6 269 1023 539
6 51 1023 0 1 178 639 515




6 52 930 0 1 179 1023 515
1 42 1023 509 6 271 1023 564
6 53 1023 0 Node inside dustbin 539
1 44 602 510 Node outside dustbin 497
6 54 1023 0
1 45 612 513
1 46 1023 513
6 55 1023 0
6 56 1023 0
6 57 1023 0
6 58 1023 0
Node inside dustbin 509
Node outside dustbin 0
Test D outside mote height=45cm, t=0.2cm
Id Sample # pir mag
1 64 1023 504
6 89 1023 511
1 65 1023 504
6 90 1023 521
6 91 1023 521
1 66 633 513
6 92 1023 503
6 93 1023 503
1 67 642 512
6 96 847 503
6 97 1023 503
6 99 1023 0
1 69 630 518
6 100 1023 504
1 70 1023 518
1 71 954 502
6 103 1023 504
1 72 1023 502
6 104 1023 504
1 73 999 525
6 107 1023 503
1 74 1023 525
6 108 1023 503
1 76 660 515
1 77 1023 515
6 111 1023 507
6 112 1023 507
1 78 653 504
1 79 1023 504
6 114 1023 581
1 81 1023 563
1 82 1023 563
6 117 1023 507
1 83 613 504
6 121 1023 504
1 84 1023 504
Node inside dustbin 516







1 74 1023 514
1 75 1023 1392
1 76 1023 1392
1 77 1023 793
1 78 1023 793
1 79 1023 608
1 80 836 747
1 81 848 502
1 82 1023 883
1 83 1023 857
1 84 898 864
1 85 1023 512
1 86 1023 1221
1 87 1023 1088
1 88 799 655
1 89 663 569
1 90 1023 569
1 91 1023 1332
1 92 1023 3349
1 93 904 996
1 94 904 578
1 95 634 1255
1 96 1023 1255
1 97 1023 1605
1 98 881 1605
1 99 1023 976
1 100 931 866
1 105 944 789
1 106 918 923
1 107 1023 944
1 108 914 868
1 111 785 754
1 112 1023 813
1 113 1023 602
819  
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